Iran and the West
WHY SHOULD THEY TRUST US?
The Iranian desire for nuclear armament reflects a century of manipulation by the West
One of the most interesting moments of diplomatic nomenclature during Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s recent trip to Europe was her cryptic response to the question of possible military action against Iran. Apparently such an event is “simply not on the agenda at this point in time”. Obtuse declarations are typical of the George Bush’s administration, and one should not be surprised if the “agenda” shifts at any point in the near future. Although Secretary Rice professed that “diplomacy can work”, it is clear that behind the scenes there is a strong desire for regime change in Tehran, by force if necessary. Seymour Hersh’s report in a recent edition of the New Yorker about US reconnaissance of potential military targets has only added to the air of inevitability.
However, it is worth at this point to examine what exactly the motivations are behind Tehran’s apparent desire for nuclear armament. Clearly the events of the past two years in neighbouring Iraq have underlined the importance of seeking an effective deterrent. Secretary Rice has, on occasion, demonstrated her continuing fixation on the Cold War by labelling the regime ‘totalitarian’, as if this is a one-size-fits-all explanation for the drive to the bomb. Certainly, the hard-line Islamic theocracy that dominates Iranian politics is repressive, and indeed reviled by most of the population, who have seen moves towards reform stymied in the last eighteen months. However, there is little doubt that anti-US sentiment runs high in the streets of Tehran, and any potential invasion would be bitterly resented and resisted. To understand precisely why Iran seems to be so hell-bent on acquiring a nuclear arsenal, we need to look at the history of relations between the country and the West, in particular the United States and Britain.
For many Americans, Iran first came to their attention with the 1979 seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, and the subsequent holding of American diplomats for fourteen months. This event, which was seized upon by presidential challenger Ronald Reagan to undermine the incumbent Jimmy Carter, terminated diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, in many ways the 1979 hostage crisis was the culmination of a 26-year old event that was for many years kept clandestine but which goes some way to explaining the current relationship between Iran and the West.
Turn back a half century. Post-World War II, Iran lay between the interests of two global powers: the British, who had been a major player in the country since the discovery of oil at the century’s turn by the prospector William Knox D’Arcy, and the Soviet Union, which had long seen Iran as a target for assimilation. In 1950, Mohammad Mossadegh was elected by the Iranian Majlis, or parliament, to the office of prime minister. Mossadegh, a long-term campaigner for Iranian national sovereignty, succeeded the following year in nationalising the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, demanding recognition that the oil – hitherto expropriated by the British with scant recompense to Iran - was his countrymen’s birthright. With the outraged British attempting to undermine him by any means, Mossadegh turned to the United States as a potential ally. At an extraordinary United Nations meeting in October of 1951, a tearful Mossadegh evocatively depicted the harsh conditions under which Iranian workers served their British rulers at the oil refinery of Abadan. A skilful performer on the world stage, Mossadegh represented for many the face of the ‘new’ third world, eager to cast off the shackles of imperialism.
Under the administration of President Harry S. Truman, the US government came to mediate between the two sides. Mossadegh himself called Truman a ‘great friend’ to Iran, and believed that he would act as a counterbalance to the British. However, by early 1953 Truman was out of office, replaced by President Eisenhower, who had run a fervent anti-communist campaign was surrounded by a firm group of Cold Warriors, convinced that Iran was the focal point of the battle between East and West. This, combined with the re-election in Britain of the trenchantly imperialist Winston Churchill, set in motion a sea change of Western attitude towards Iran. In August of 1953, the CIA – and the British Secret Intelligence Service (nowadays known as MI6) – planned and executed Operation Ajax, which deposed the populist Mossadegh and returned Shah Reza Pahlavi to the throne.
While much of this at the time was unknown in the West, the people of Iran were fully aware that – once again – the history of their country was being usurped and determined by foreign rule. Things became worse when the Shah, given huge sums of money by the U.S. and Britain in order to achieve national stability, implemented a repressive and hard-line regime, using his SAVAK secret police to crack down on dissident groups and siphoning much of the profits from oil away for his own personal use. While the Shah’s profligacy and corruption angered the masses, his secular disdain for Islamic traditions enraged the clergy, particularly the Ayatollah Khomeini, who returned from his exile in Paris to lead the country after the 1979 revolution.
Thus Iranians in general have a strong justification in resenting the West, in particular the United States and the British. While relations between Tehran and London have improved in recent years, particularly since the election of the reformist-minded President Khatami in 1997, the US and Iran continue to lack diplomatic representation. The hostage crisis, US support for Iraq during the horrifying war of the 1980s, and the absurd monikers given by each side to the other - “axis of evil”, “Great Satan” – indicate that this is likely to continue. Can it be any wonder that Iran appears to wish to arm itself, when two of their toothless neighbours have fallen in the past three years? Whatever sabre-rattling the US government may pride itself on, it is through diplomacy, and diplomacy alone, that we should engage with Tehran.
The Iranian desire for nuclear armament reflects a century of manipulation by the West
One of the most interesting moments of diplomatic nomenclature during Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s recent trip to Europe was her cryptic response to the question of possible military action against Iran. Apparently such an event is “simply not on the agenda at this point in time”. Obtuse declarations are typical of the George Bush’s administration, and one should not be surprised if the “agenda” shifts at any point in the near future. Although Secretary Rice professed that “diplomacy can work”, it is clear that behind the scenes there is a strong desire for regime change in Tehran, by force if necessary. Seymour Hersh’s report in a recent edition of the New Yorker about US reconnaissance of potential military targets has only added to the air of inevitability.
However, it is worth at this point to examine what exactly the motivations are behind Tehran’s apparent desire for nuclear armament. Clearly the events of the past two years in neighbouring Iraq have underlined the importance of seeking an effective deterrent. Secretary Rice has, on occasion, demonstrated her continuing fixation on the Cold War by labelling the regime ‘totalitarian’, as if this is a one-size-fits-all explanation for the drive to the bomb. Certainly, the hard-line Islamic theocracy that dominates Iranian politics is repressive, and indeed reviled by most of the population, who have seen moves towards reform stymied in the last eighteen months. However, there is little doubt that anti-US sentiment runs high in the streets of Tehran, and any potential invasion would be bitterly resented and resisted. To understand precisely why Iran seems to be so hell-bent on acquiring a nuclear arsenal, we need to look at the history of relations between the country and the West, in particular the United States and Britain.
For many Americans, Iran first came to their attention with the 1979 seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, and the subsequent holding of American diplomats for fourteen months. This event, which was seized upon by presidential challenger Ronald Reagan to undermine the incumbent Jimmy Carter, terminated diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, in many ways the 1979 hostage crisis was the culmination of a 26-year old event that was for many years kept clandestine but which goes some way to explaining the current relationship between Iran and the West.
Turn back a half century. Post-World War II, Iran lay between the interests of two global powers: the British, who had been a major player in the country since the discovery of oil at the century’s turn by the prospector William Knox D’Arcy, and the Soviet Union, which had long seen Iran as a target for assimilation. In 1950, Mohammad Mossadegh was elected by the Iranian Majlis, or parliament, to the office of prime minister. Mossadegh, a long-term campaigner for Iranian national sovereignty, succeeded the following year in nationalising the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, demanding recognition that the oil – hitherto expropriated by the British with scant recompense to Iran - was his countrymen’s birthright. With the outraged British attempting to undermine him by any means, Mossadegh turned to the United States as a potential ally. At an extraordinary United Nations meeting in October of 1951, a tearful Mossadegh evocatively depicted the harsh conditions under which Iranian workers served their British rulers at the oil refinery of Abadan. A skilful performer on the world stage, Mossadegh represented for many the face of the ‘new’ third world, eager to cast off the shackles of imperialism.
Under the administration of President Harry S. Truman, the US government came to mediate between the two sides. Mossadegh himself called Truman a ‘great friend’ to Iran, and believed that he would act as a counterbalance to the British. However, by early 1953 Truman was out of office, replaced by President Eisenhower, who had run a fervent anti-communist campaign was surrounded by a firm group of Cold Warriors, convinced that Iran was the focal point of the battle between East and West. This, combined with the re-election in Britain of the trenchantly imperialist Winston Churchill, set in motion a sea change of Western attitude towards Iran. In August of 1953, the CIA – and the British Secret Intelligence Service (nowadays known as MI6) – planned and executed Operation Ajax, which deposed the populist Mossadegh and returned Shah Reza Pahlavi to the throne.
While much of this at the time was unknown in the West, the people of Iran were fully aware that – once again – the history of their country was being usurped and determined by foreign rule. Things became worse when the Shah, given huge sums of money by the U.S. and Britain in order to achieve national stability, implemented a repressive and hard-line regime, using his SAVAK secret police to crack down on dissident groups and siphoning much of the profits from oil away for his own personal use. While the Shah’s profligacy and corruption angered the masses, his secular disdain for Islamic traditions enraged the clergy, particularly the Ayatollah Khomeini, who returned from his exile in Paris to lead the country after the 1979 revolution.
Thus Iranians in general have a strong justification in resenting the West, in particular the United States and the British. While relations between Tehran and London have improved in recent years, particularly since the election of the reformist-minded President Khatami in 1997, the US and Iran continue to lack diplomatic representation. The hostage crisis, US support for Iraq during the horrifying war of the 1980s, and the absurd monikers given by each side to the other - “axis of evil”, “Great Satan” – indicate that this is likely to continue. Can it be any wonder that Iran appears to wish to arm itself, when two of their toothless neighbours have fallen in the past three years? Whatever sabre-rattling the US government may pride itself on, it is through diplomacy, and diplomacy alone, that we should engage with Tehran.
posted by DN at 11:19 AM
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